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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Plaintiffs in this action are M. Dalton Cannon, and his
wife, Patricia Cannon. The only defendant in the instant appeal is
the University of Utah. Defendant Malissa K. Austin was dismissed
from this action pursuant to a separate settlement and is not a
party to the instant appeal. R. 165-168. Defendants Brian Purvis
and Kim Beglarian were dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the
parties and are not parties to the instant appeal.

R. 140-141.
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Mountain S t a t e s T e l , v . G a r f i e l d County, Hll P,2d

184, 192 (Utah 1991).
2.

Can the University of Utah be held liable on a theory of

landowner liability to the plaintiffs as "business invitees" for an
accident that did not occur on land owned or controlled by the
University of Utah?
STANDARD OP REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
3.

Was any action, or inaction, of employees

of the

University of Utah a proximate cause of the complained of accident?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking the

affidavits of Mr. Cannon and Mr. Lord?
STANDARD OP REVIEW:

In reviewing the decision of the trial

court on the admissibility of evidence, this Court will not reverse
such a decision absent an abuse of discretion affecting a party's
substantial rights. Hardy v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App.
1989) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Defendants

do

not

believe

there

are

any

statutes

the

interpretation of which are determinative of the issues presented
in this action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, M. Dalton and Patricia Cannon, brought this action
alleging that they were injured by the negligence of Malissa
Austin, the driver of an automobile that struck the plaintiffs
2

while they were crossing South Campus Drive inside a crosswalk. R.
2-6. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add as additional
defendants the University of Utah and two of its officers. R. 6371.

The two officers of the University were dismissed pursuant to

stipulation of the parties.

R. 140-141.

The plaintiffs settled

with Ms. Austin and dismissed her from the action.

R. 165-167.

Plaintiffs then filed a new amended complaint in which the sole
defendant was the University of Utah. R. 174-181. The University
of Utah moved for summary judgment, which was granted. R. 248-249,
430-435, 439-440. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their action
against the University of Utah.

R. 443-446.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
This action arises out of an auto/pedestrian accident on
February 1, 1990 at approximately 6:57 p.m..

[R. 176 at 1 8] . It

had been raining or snowing that afternoon and it was dark.
270] .

[R.

Plaintiffs allege that they were using the cross walk to

cross South Campus Drive in a northerly direction when a 1987
Toyota Pick-up truck driven by Malissa K. Austin struck them.
176 at 1 8] .

[R.

Officers Beglarian and Purvis were assigned to

traffic control at the subject cross walk. [R. 267].
As was normal practice for traffic control at the subject
cross walk,

officers

Beglarian and

Purvis

arrived

there at

approximately 6:30 p.m., or thereafter, parked the car in the
center lane with the flashers on and set up flares.
271, 276-279, 285, and 289].
flares were still burning.

[R. 267-269,

At the time of the accident, the

[R. 272-273, 288].

3

On the night in question, the plaintiffs were dressed in dark
clothing,

[R. 283] . Upon reaching the cross walk, the plaintiffs

saw the police car parked in the median lane, but did not see the
police officers anywhere. Mr. Cannon remarked to Mrs. Cannon that,
"they're not going to stop the traffic for us now like they
generally do.11

[R. 293]. Knowing that the police officers were

not going to stop traffic for them, the plaintiffs waited for some
cars to go by and then began to cross South Campus Drive. [R. 293] .
The car driven by Ms. Austin struck the Cannons as they were
nearing the inside lane, towards the north side of the South Campus
Drive.

[R. 281-282].

Prior to impact neither Officer Beglarian,

nor Officer Purvis ever saw the Cannons.

[R. 271, 287].

At the time of the accident, both officers were about to
resume traffic control.

[R. 274]. Officer Purvis was putting on

his gloves and Officer Beglarian was looking South and exiting the
car.

[R. 269, 271, 286]. University police are not to engage in

parking control.

[R. 37-38].

Plaintiffs contend that the negligent acts of the defendant
University of Utah and its employees were a proximate cause of the
accident.

[R. 16 at 1l6]

In particular, plaintiffs contend that

Officers Purvis and Beglarian, while on duty and acting within the
scope of their employment, with the University of Utah acted
negligently by: (1) failing to monitor or direct pedestrian traffic
crossing the pedestrian cross walk or halt oncoming vehicles so as
to reduce the chance of an auto/pedestrian accident; (2) parking
their vehicle in such a manner as to obscure pedestrians view of
4

the on-coming westbound traffic; (3) failing to insure that the
pedestrian crosswalk was adequately lighted and marked by flares;
(4) permitting vehicles to park illegally at the southern end of
the pedestrian crosswalk so as to obscure pedestrians view of
westbound traffic.
In

addition,

[R. 178 at 1 15] .
the

plaintiffs

claim

University of Utah was negligent in: (1)

that

the defendant,

providing inadequate

lighting of said crosswalk area, such the pedestrians in the
crosswalks were not sufficiently visible to approaching motorists;
(2) failing to provide adequate temporary warning signs at times of
heavy pedestrian usage prior to events at the Huntsman Center; and;
(3) failing to adequately maintain painted markings and signs
indicating the location of the crosswalk.

[R. 179-180 at 1 23] .

The University of Utah has nothing to do with the maintenance,
painting, signage, etc, of South Campus Drive.

[R. 296-302].

South Campus Drive is a State owned road, under the jurisdiction of
the Utah Department

of Transportation.

[R. 296-302].

The

painting, lighting, signage, and maintenance of South Campus Drive
is the responsibility of the Utah Department of Transportation and
not the University of Utah.

[R. 296-302].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The University of Utah owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were injured in an automobile-pedestrian accident on a
roadway owned, maintained, and operated by the Utah Department of
Transportation, a non-party to this action. The University did not
have control or custody of the driver of the motor vehicle in
5

question. The plaintiffs were not in the control or custody of the
University.

The plaintiffs were not minors, or members of any

class whose care had been entrusted to the University. Absent such
a relationship the University of Utah owed no affirmative duty to
the plaintiffs to protect them from Malissa Austin's poor driving.
Because the accident occurred on a public highway, and not on
the premises of the University of Utah, no landowner liability can
be shown.

A landowner is not liable to the public or business

invitees for the conditions of the public roadway.

Such a claim

should properly be brought against the agency or government that
owns and maintains the roadway.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UNIVERSITY OWED NO SPECIFIC
DUTY OF CARE TO THE CANNONS

An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty of care
owed by a defendant to a particular plaintiff.
784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).

Ferree v. State.

To establish a negligence claim

against a public entity, a plaintiff must show the entity breached
a duty owed specifically to the plaintiff as an individual, rather
than one owed generally to the public at large. I£. There can be
no negligence where the entity merely breaches a public duty. Id.
The existence of such a duty is determined by the court. Weber ex
rel. Weber v. Sprincrville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986).
The public duty doctrine is followed in an overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, State v. Flaniaan, 489 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986), and Utah is one that has long recognized the rule.
In Obray v. Malmbercr. 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971), the
6

Supreme

Court

of Utah

held

that

a

sheriff's

obligation

to

investigate crime is a duty to the public at large and that a
breach of this duty isf consequently, not actionable.

A similar

result was reached in Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah
1984).

Christenson held that a deputy's statutory duty to "make

all lawful arrests" was a public obligation rather than a private
duty to the plaintiff's decedent.

Id. at 613.

The public duty rule was once again relied upon in Ferree v.
State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989).

Ferree involved a wrongful death

action alleging that corrections officers were "reckless, negligent
or grossly negligent" in their failure to supervise a parolee who
killed the plaintiffs' decedent.

In affirming summary judgment,

the Supreme Court of Utah held that the officers owed no duty of
care to the victim apart from their general obligation to the
public at large. Id. at 151.
The public duty rule applies with equal force to actions
alleging negligent control of traffic (as opposed to negligent
maintenance of the roadway).
responsibilities

Public entities with traffic control

cannot be held

liable

particular duty to a specific individual.
N.E.2d 1216, 1219

(Ind. App. 1986).

in the absence

of a

State v. Flanigan. 489

An obligation to control

traffic for the general public's benefit simply does not create a
duty of care on which a negligence claim may be based.

Id.

In Flanigan. the plaintiffs were injured when a car struck
them as they walked along a state highway to attend a flea market.
Id. at 1217. Like the instant case, plaintiffs sued the State [of

7

Indiana] claiming it was negligent because it "had a duty to assure
safe pedestrian and vehicular traffic on the highway and failed to
provide any traffic control to assure that pedestrians could travel
on the highways safely." I&.

The State moved unsuccessfully for

judgment on the pleadings and appealed.

Id.

In Flanigan. the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court because the state had no duty to the plaintiffs.

Id. at

1219. Any obligation to provide traffic control was a public duty,
according to the court, and a breach of such a duty was not
actionable. .Id. Since there was no particularized duty to protect
the plaintiffs from errant vehicles, the court held the state was
not liable.

Xd.

The court found traffic control to be a non-

actionable public duty.
In the instant case, plaintiffs' claims of negligence with
respect to Officers Purvis and Beglarian amount to nothing more
than failure to generally protect the public through aspects of
traffic control, a public duty. The alleged negligent acts all go
to the officers' duties generally, as opposed to any assumed on
behalf

of

the

plaintiffs

specifically.

Indeed,

it

is

uncontroverted that the officers did not even see the Cannons, who
on a dark and stormy night, were wearing dark clothing.

Even more

pointedly, Mr. Cannon candidly admits that neither he nor his wife
saw the officers, and they discussed the fact that no officer would
be helping them cross the street that evening. Nevertheless, they
undertook to cross the five lane street as they had done many times
before.

Unlike cases where there are special relationships and
8

reliance; no relationship existed between the Cannons and the
officers. The Cannons were not relying on the officers in any way.
Officers Purvis and Beglarian were not engaged in traffic control
at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs, prior to crossing the
street, recognized that there was no ongoing traffic control. They
therefor undertook to cross the street without assistance. Having
never undertaken a duty to these specific plaintiffs, there can be
no claim.
There is simply no basis upon which to impose a duty upon the
officers other than their duty to the public generally.

Yet as

demonstrated above, failure to perform a duty to the public is not
actionable.
The plaintiffs do not dispute that the Public Duty Doctrine
continues to be recognized by Utah as limiting claims against
governmental entities for violation of duties owed to the public at
large.

On the night of the accident the officers were engaged in

one such general duty, that of enforcing the traffic laws governing
auto and pedestrian travel. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-78. In that
respect, their job was no different than other types of law
enforcement, such as investigating alleged burglaries.

In each

given instance, officers have a public duty to enforce the law.
But they owe no legal duty to come to the aid or assistance of
anyone in particular.

Any failure to do so in this case is no

different than the failure in Chris tens en v. Hayward. 694 P. 2d 612
(Utah 1984), where the Court held that a deputy's duty to "make all
lawful arrests" was a public obligation rather than a private duty
9

to the plaintiff which was not actionable.

.Id. at 613.

Traffic

control is enforcing laws governing auto and pedestrian travel, and
is merely another form of law enforcement, a public duty. Indeed,
plaintiffs tacitly admit as much.

Seeking to overcome the public

duty obstacle, plaintiffs attempt to bring themselves within the
"special relationship" exception. That attempt falls short because
neither Malissa Austin, the driver of the vehicle involved, or the
plaintiffs were in the custody or control of the University.
Coffel v. Clallam County. 735 P.2d 686 (Wash. App. 1987),
cited

by

principle.

the

plaintiffs

below

(R.

400), demonstrates

this

There the court listed the required elements of the

"special relationship" exception to the public duty doctrine as
"(1) there is some form of privity between the police department
and the victim that sets the victim apart from the general public,
and (2) there are explicit assurances of protection that give rise
to reliance on the part of the victim."

Ifl. at 690.

The Supreme Court of Utah, in Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d
1156 (Utah 1991), sought to more fully explain the meaning of the
special relationship exception.

After stating that the general

rule, adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314-320
(1965) , that there is no duty to control the conduct of third
persons, the Court adopted the Restatement's provision of two
exceptions to this general rule.

First, if a special relation

exists between the actor and the third person, then the actor has
a duty to control the third person's conduct. Second, if a special
relation exists between the actor and the plaintiff.
10

These two

exceptions are given more detailed explanation in sections 319 and
314 respectively of the Restatement. Section 319 provides that one
who takes charge of a third person, whom is likely to cause bodily
harm to others if not controlled, is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to control the third person. Section 314A provides
the four circumstances when a special duty arises between the
plaintiff and the actor.

These circumstances are: (1) a common

carrier's duty to its passengers, (2) an innkeeper's similar duty
to its guests, (3) a landowner's duty to invitees on its land, and
(4) "One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes
the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the
other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar
duty to the other."
Malissa Austin, the driver has not even been alleged to meet
the criteria of Restatement, Second, Torts § 319 (1965) as one with
dangerous propensities. Nor has any effort been made to show that
she was under the control or supervision of the University of Utah.
Any special relationship would have to be between the University of
Utah and the plaintiffs. Clearly the common carrier and innkeeper
circumstances are not applicable.

The landowner circumstance is

also inapplicable because the public highway was not under the
control of the University.
(1965).

The

final

Restatement, Second, Torts § 349

circumstance

does not

apply because the

plaintiffs were never in the custody or control of the University.
Because none of the exceptions can apply, the general rule
must be applicable.

Restatement, Second, Torts § 314 (1965) is

11

clear.
The fact that the actor realizes or should
realize that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action.
In support of their duty argument that a special relationship
existed, the plaintiffs rely upon two foreign cases, Alhambra
School District v. Superior Court. 796 P.2d 470, 474 (Ariz. 1990)
and Florence v. Goldberg. 375 N.E.2d 763, 766 (N.Y. App. 1978).
For several

reasons, plaintiffs' reliance

on these

cases is

misplaced.
First, while the facts of the Alhambra School District case
are markedly different and distinguishable from the case at hand,
the case is inapplicable because eight years prior to its decision
the Arizona Supreme Court flatly rejected the public duty doctrine.
See. Ryan v. State of Arizona. 656 P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982).
Unlike Utah and the majority of states where the public duty
doctrine recognized, the Arizona Supreme Court specifically found
that Arizona may no longer benefit from its public status in the
determination of the existence of a duty.

JEd.

For this obvious

reason, Alhambra has no precedential value here. However, even if
it somehow did, the specific facts of that case highlight its
inapplicability.
There, pursuant to a specific Arizona statute, the Alhambra
School District created a school crossing and therefore by statute
was required "to operate the crossing in conformance to the Arizona
School Crossing Manual•n

Ifl. at 472.
12

When the defendant school

district questioned its duty to the public, the court responded
"the answer, of course, is that the district applied for and
established a specifically marked crosswalk, where none previously
existed."

I&. at 474. Under the Arizona statute the creation of

the crosswalk created a public duty which under Arizona precedent
did not preclude a negligence claim.

The Alhambra court was

constrained to hold that creation of the walk also created a duty
of reasonable care.
However, unlike Alhambra. in the instant case the plaintiffs
concede that the University was not responsible for and did not
create the crosswalk.

The crosswalk and roadway in question are

both owned, designed, operated and maintained by the Utah State
Department of Transportation (UDOT) . UDOT is not a party to the
instant action. The University was not obligated by law to operate
it in conformance with any rules or regulations.

The limited

holding of Alhambra is plainly inapplicable.
The plaintiffs' only other authority, the New York decision of
Florence v. Goldberg, supra. contains factual differences which not
only preclude its application here, but also demonstrate the
absence

of

the

"special

relationship"

necessary

to

sustain

plaintiffs' claim. In Florence, a municipality voluntarily assumed
a duty to supervise a school crossing for infants at a busy, twoway street.

Indeed, the police department had enacted specific

regulations with checks to insure that a crossing guard would be
present at the crossing at the times when small school children
would be crossing.

13

Every day during the first two weeks of school a mother
accompanied her small child to and from school and noticed a
crossing guard at the fatal intersection.

Having witnessed the

daily presence of the crossing guard, the child's mother then
relied upon the presence and assistance of the guard, and sent her
child off to school alone one day.

Tragically, no guard was

present and the child was struck by a taxi--because the police
completely failed to follow their regulations to insure against the
walk being unguarded.

The Court held:

A municipality
whose
police
department
voluntarily assumes a duty to supervise school
crossings, the assumption of that duty having
been relied upon by parents of school children
may be held liable for its negligent omission
to provide a guard at a designated crossing.
Id. at 585-586

(emphasis added).

In stark contrast

to the

plaintiffs' situation here, Florence involved assumption of a duty
to a specific class of dependent persons, school age children, and
specific reliance by a parent on the assumption and performance of
that duty. The same is true of Little v. Utah State Div. of Family
Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).

Little involved a young child

who had been taken into the custody of the State of Utah.

The

child, while under state control, died due to the negligent care of
the state.

In Little, the requisite special relationship was

demonstrated.
The Cannons simply cannot make that claim here.

The Cannons

were competent, physically able, adults who undoubtedly had crossed
streets hundreds of times before the night in question.

In fact,

with respect to the very street where the accident occurred, the
14

Cannons had crossed at that precise location countless times
before.

There is no evidence that the particular crosswalk was

unreasonably dangerous or that the Cannons needed assistance. Even
if the crosswalk was defective, it was not owned or operated by the
University of Utah, but by the Utah Department of Transportation.
Mr. Cannon's sworn testimony

is that upon reaching the

crosswalk and not seeing any policemen anywhere he remarked to Mrs.
Cannon that "they're not going to stop the traffic for us now like
they generally do."

(R. 293). Knowing that the police officers

were not going to stop traffic for them, the Cannons waited for
some cars to go by and then crossed the street.

(IcL)

The

officers here did nothing with respect to the Cannons, and did not
assume any duty with respect to them.

There simply was no

relationship between the Cannons and the police officers on the
night in question. Perhaps more importantly, there was no reliance
by the Cannons upon the officers. Plaintiffs' claim that they had
somehow been "entrusted to the care" of the University of Utah is
without support.

(Appellants' Brief at 27).

They were not under

the custody or control of the University. No special relationship
existed that would identify these plaintiffs from any other member
of the public who might use crosswalks in the vicinity of the
University of Utah.
Plaintiffs efforts to find a special relationship between the
University of Utah and those attending a university sporting event
is reminiscent of Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah
1986).

Beach rejected any special relationship being created by
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the relationship of student and school. The Supreme Court of Utah
also held that, absent such a special relationship, the University
of Utah had no affirmative duty to protect or supervise the
plaintiff.
Plaintiffs are incorrect in alleging that there are any
material issues of fact that are in dispute.

Whether the flares

were still burning, or the emergency lights on. the University's car
were operating, are not material. These questions of fact do not
change the sole important fact that the University of Utah did not
have

a

special

relationship

with

the plaintiffs

upon which

liability could be based.
Accordingly, the trial court was correct when it ruled that
the University of Utah was entitled to summary judgment dismissing
the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.
II.
PLAINTIFFS1 LANDOWNER LIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS NO
APPLICATION TO A POLICE OFFICER'S PUBLIC SAFETY / LAW
ENFORCEMENT DUTIES.
Premised upon a landowner liability analysis, plaintiffs argue
that as "business invitees", defendant owed them a duty of care
even though the accident at issue did not occur on the property of
the University of Utah. Fortunately, for unsuspecting businesses,
this is not the law.

On the contrary, as recently stated in

Dwigqjns v. Marsan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) and
Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987),
cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277

(1988),

"property owners are not

insurers for the safety of their business invitees."
The "business invitees" doctrine is inapplicable to this
16

action for two fundamental reasons.

First, the instant action

seeks to impose upon a landowner responsibility for injuries
sustained off the landowner's premises.
Secondly, plaintiffs have confused the different nature of
landowner duties and those attendant with public safety/police
power functions.
None of the cases cited by plaintiffs extend a landowner's
duty to property owned by others. Yet that is precisely what the
plaintiffs seek to do in the instant case. The plaintiffs readily
concede that they have no claim against the University for the
ownership, maintenance or condition of the street in which the
accident occurred, South Campus Drive.

(R. 395, footnote 1).

fact, they have specifically withdrawn that claim.

(Id.)

In
But

landowner liability contemplates persons "coming on his property,"
Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 478 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1970), and
governs claims against a landowner by "one who is injured on his
property,"

Tias v. Proctor. 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979).

This

is not a case of an invitee who is injured while watching a game
due to an unreasonably dangerous condition in the arena.

See

Cimino v. Yale University. 638 F. Supp. 952 (D. Conn. 1986) (goal
post struck spectator in stadium).
Despite acknowledging that they may not maintain a claim
against

the University

premised

upon

ownership,

the

Cannons

nevertheless seek to impose liability upon the University based
upon landowner duties.

In so doing, they are confusing two

markedly different and distinct types of duty. On the one hand, a
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landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance
of his property to avoid exposing persons who come upon his land to
an unreasonable risk of harm.
But that is not a claim that the plaintiffs have made in this
action and, as they have acknowledged, in light of the fact that
the street was owned and under the jurisdiction of the Utah
Department of Transportation, such a claim could not be made
against the University.
However, plaintiffs seek to superimpose that landowner duty
upon University police engaged in a public safety/police protection
function. The police power is derived from a different source and
is supported by policies far different than those applicable to a
landowner.
Plaintiffs have not suggested that there was a duty to provide
traffic control in the first instance. On the contrary, plaintiffs
argue that by undertaking traffic control, defendant was required
to continue to perform it. The duty plaintiffs claim was breached
is a law enforcement, not a landowner duty.

Accordingly, the

business invitee analysis offered by plaintiffs has no application.
Indeed, plaintiffs reliance on Restatement, Second, Torts §
344 (1965), is misplaced.

The applicable provision is found at

Restatement, Second, Torts § 349 (1965).
A possessor of land over which there is a
public highway or private right of way is not
subject to liability for physical harm caused
to travelers upon the highway or persons
lawfully using the way by his failure to
exercise reasonable care
(a) to maintain the highway or way in safe
condition for their use, or
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(b)
the
are
nor

to warn them of dangerous conditions in
way, which, although not created by him,
known to him and which they neither know
are likely to discover.

No material facts are in dispute.

The University of Utah did

not own, operate, or maintain the roadway in which the accident in
question occurred.

There can be no liability on the University as

the owner of abutting land.
III. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN TO PRODUCE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING PROXIMATE CAUSE.
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court set out the definition of proximate cause.
The standard definition of proximate cause is "that
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces
the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.
It is the efficient cause - the one that
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish
the injury."
697 P.2d at 245 (footnote omitted) . Proximate cause is one of the
elements of a negligence claim upon which the plaintiffs bear the
burden

of

proof.

Rather

than

set

forth

specific

facts

demonstrating that the conduct of the officers was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs1 injuries, plaintiffs instead rely upon the
general rule that proximate cause in a negligence case is usually
a jury question.

Brief of Appellants at page 35, and speculation

regarding flares, and the location of the car.

But plaintiffs'

argument is insufficient to create a genuine issue as to proximate
cause.

There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that the

flares were not burning or that the placement of the car had
anything to do with the accident.
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On the contrary, the officers

testified that the flares were burning and that a driver shouldn't
have

had

difficulty

seeing

pedestrians

walking

in

the

two

northernmost westbound lanes, where the Cannons were struck. Any
conclusion to the contrary is pure conjecture.
In Mitchell, the Court noted that "when proximate cause of an
injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law."
Id. at 246.

The Court also held "There must be evidence that

establishes a direct causal connection between the negligence and
the injury."

ig. at 245. No such evidence exists here.

Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to the trial court that would
show that any action of the defendant, or its employees, was a
proximate cause of the accident in question.

Pursuant to Rule

56(c) and (e), defendant was entitled to summary judgment.
Even if the affidavit

of plaintiffs' expert witness is

considered, the result does not change.

(R. 378-381).

While

reciting the officers' statements of what they felt their duty was,
the expert does not give any facts at all upon which to support his
mere speculation that the accident was caused by the officers. No
foundation is given as to how the presence of the officers in the
crosswalk would have resulted in anything other than a possible
third victim of Ms. Austin's failure to yield to the pedestrians in
the crosswalk.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN STRIKING THE UNTIMELY AFFIDAVITS
PROFFERRED BY THE PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs have misstated the standard of review relevant to
this issue. This Court has stated that it will not reverse a trial
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court's determination on the admissibility of proffered evidence
absent an abuse of discretion affecting a party's substantial
rights. Hardv v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App. 1989). Hardy
involved a question of the timeliness of the evidence's receipt and
the question of an expert witness' qualifications.
Proctor. 591 P.2d 438, 440

In Tias v.

(Utah 1979), the Court held that

determination of the question of whether adequate foundation has
been laid for the introduction of evidence is solely within the
discretion of the trial court.
The affidavits of M. Dalton Cannon and David Lord were not
filed with the trial court until 4:36 p.m. on the evening before a
9:00 a.m. hearing.

(R. 378, 382). A full day was not provided the

defendant to review or oppose these affidavits.

Therefore these

affidavits were not timely pursuant to Rule 6 (d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. To rule otherwise would be to permit the late
filing of affidavits the evening before an early morning hearing as
a subterfuge to circumvent the provisions of the rule.
The Affidavit of M. Dalton Cannon is an effort to change Mr.
Cannon's deposition testimony, presented to the Court by defendant
in its motion for summary judgment, by means of an affidavit.

In

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme
Court held that a contradictory affidavit which wholly fails to
explain the discrepancy between the deposition and affidavit was
insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Both

affidavits

were

also

correctly

stricken

as

being

immaterial to the issues at hand. Neither of the affidavits are of
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any benefit to the court in deciding the legal questions under the
public duty doctrine or landowner liability for accidents occurring
off the landowner's property.
Mr.

Lord's

affidavit

concludes

that

the

officers

were

negligent and that this negligence caused, in part, the complained
of accident. This affidavit is solely the reflection of Mr. Lord's
unsubstantiated conclusions and fails to contain any supporting
facts in evidence to support this bald assumption.

American

Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead. 751 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah App. 1988).
Nowhere does Mr. Lord claim to be an expert on police procedure.
His testimony is irrelevant and was properly stricken.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly dismissed this action on the basis of
there being no duty owed by the University of Utah to the
plaintiffs. For this reason the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

//

day of October, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
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